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By Danielle Citron
THE INTERNET IS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD. While it can facilitate
the empowerment of people who often face discrimination, it can also
be exploited to disenfranchise them. Anonymous mobs employ collabo-
rative technologies to terrorize and silence women, people of color, and
other minorities, effectively denying them the right to participate in
online life as equals.
Consider the case of Bonnie Jouhari, a civil rights advocate and
mother of a biracial girl, who was targeted by a white supremacist
website. The site posted her child's picture and Ms. Jouhari's home
address and showed an animated picture of Ms. Jouhari's workplace
exploding in flames next to the threat that "race traitors" are "hung
from the neck from the nearest tree or lamp post." After Ms. Jouhari
and her daughter began receiving harassing phone calls at home and
work, she left her job and moved. Today, neither she nor her daughter
maintains a driver's license, voter registration card, or bank account
because they fear creating a public record of their whereabouts.
Another example: Kathy Sierra, a programmer and game developer,
who maintained a popular blog on software development called
"Creating Passionate Users." In 2007, anonymous individuals attacked
Ms. Sierra on her blog and two other websites. Posters threatened rape
and strangulation. They revealed her home address and Social Security
number, Doctored photographs featured her with a noose beside her
neck; another depicted her screaming while being suffocated by lingerie.
After the attack, Ms. Sierra canceled speaking engagements and feared
leaving her yard. In April 2009, she explained that her "blog [once]
was in the Technorati Top 100. I have not blogged there-or
anywhere-since. "
Many view
these attacks as
isolated instances I
When online mobs attack individuals because of their race, gender,
or other protected characteristic, they damage individuals, their groups,
and society in unique ways. To be sure, traditional criminal and tort
law can reach some of their injuries. Criminal law punishes online
harassment and threats. For instance, the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) punishes anyone using a telecommunications device without
disclosing his identity and with the intent to "abuse, threaten, or harass
any person who receives the communication." Tort law would provide
redress for a cyber harasser's actions. Individuals can bring defamation
suits if online lies ruin their reputations. They can seek money damages
for emotional distress that a defendant intentionally or recklessly causes.
They can bring privacy claims against defendants who publicly disclosed
private facts that would be "highly offensive to the reasonable person."
These traditional remedies are important-but they have a limited
role. Defamation law, for instance, remedies a plaintiff's reputational
harm caused by online lies, but does not address the stigma and eco-
nomic injuries that individuals experience. Nor does it redress the harm
that targeted groups and society suffer in the wake of bias-motivated
conduct. Civil rights laws are designed to respond to such harm.
Antidiscrimination laws guarantee the right to be free of unequal treat-
ment on the basis of race, gender, or other protected characteristics.
Civil rights remedies would combat a cyber mob's interference with
individuals' right to work and participate in discourse online as equals.
Existing civil rights laws provide tools to combat anonymous online
mobs. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, for instance, punishes "force or
threat [s] of force" designed to intimidate or interfere with a person's
private employment due to that person's race, religion, or national
origin. Courts have sustained convictions
of defendants who made death threats
over employees' e-mail and voicemail.
Current law should be amended to
criminalize online threats made because
of a victim's gender or sexual orientation.
Although the Supreme Court struck
down VAWl\s regulation of gender-motivated violence on the
grounds that such criminal conduct did not sufficiently affect interstate
commerce to justify congressional action under the Commerce Clause,
Congress could amend VAWA pursuant to its power to regulate
an instrumentality of interstate commerce-the Internet-to punish
anonymous cyber mobs that threaten individuals because of their
gender or sexual orientation. The Department of Justice would preswn-
ably support such a development as it currently encourages federal
prosecutors to seek hate crime penalty enhancements for defendants
who subject victims to cyber harassment because of their race, color,
religion, national origin, or sexual orientation.
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of cyber bullying.
But anonymous
mobs accomplish
something far
more systematic than that. Rather than attacking a random mix of indi-
viduals, cyber mobs disproportionately target women. The non-profit
organization Working to Halt Online Abuse explains that, from 2000
to 2007, 72.5 percent of the individuals reporting cyber harassment
identified themselves as women and 22 percent identified themselves as
men. Half of those individuals had no relationship with their attackers.
Similarly, the National Center for Victims of Crimes' Stalking Resource
Center reports that approximately 60 percent of online harassment cases
involve male attackers and female targets. Cyber mobs often target
lesbian andlor non-white women with particular virulence. They also
focus on men of color, religious minorities, and gay men.
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Civil rights laws also sanction private lawsuits against cyber mobs
for their discriminatory actions. Under section 1981 of Tide 42 of the
u.s. Code, courts have allowed plaintiffs to bring claims against masked
mobs that use tactics of intimidation to prevent members of racial
minorities from "making a living" in their chosen field. And targeted
individuals can sue attackers under Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for preventing them from making a living because of their sex.
Many will, of course, oppose a cyber civil rights agenda on the
grounds that it would interfere with our commitment to free speech.
A cyber civil rights agenda, however, comports with First Amendment
doctrine and free speech values. First Amendment jurisprudence would
not immunize a cyber mob's conduct from regulation and does not
prohibit states from using criminal and civil law to forbid threats.
Threats of violence made via new technologies are not immunized
from penalry on free speech grounds.
The First Amendment does not prohibit states from using
criminal and civil law to forbid threats. Threats of violence made via
new technologies are not immunized from penalry on free speech
grounds. This issue, however, becomes more complicated with crimes
that are interwoven with arguably expressive activiry. Is the burning of a
cross on the lawn of an African-American family best characterized as
a threat? Or is it the expression of a view about race which, though
noxious, is protected by the First Amendment? The Court answered
these questions in Virginia v. Black, where it held that a state may ban
cross burning if the defendant carried it out with the intent to intimi-
date. As the Court explained, the First Amendment does not protect
"true threats" that communicate a serious intention to commit violence
against particular individuals. The Court distinguished cross burnings
done with the intent to intimidate, which it deemed a proscribable
"true threat," from cross-burning for other purposes, which it held
constituted a protected expression of viewpoint.
The Court's reasoning applies here. Postings can constitute
"true threats" if they convey a serious intention to inflict bodily harm
upon the targeted individual, even if they combine the threatening
language with protected offensive views. The anonymous threats to
inflict bodily harm upon Kathy Sierra, and others like them, are
afforded no protection under First Amendment law. Reputation-
harming falsehoods similarly enjoy no First Amendment protection
if they assert or imply facts.
The First Amendment does not bar antidiscrimination actions
even though civil rights violations communicate bigoted views. It poses
no obstacle to civil rights claims because they proscribe defendants'
unequal treatment of individuals and the unique harm that such dis-
crimination inflicts, not the offensive messages that defendants send.
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Court considered a First Amendment
challenge to a Wisconsin statute enhancing the penalty of certain
crimes if the perpetrator selected the victim because of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry. The
Court unanimously rejected the defendant's claim that the statute
punished him for his racist views. It explained that the statute did not
transgress the First Amendment because it penalized the defendant's
discriminatory motive for his conduct, not his bigoted ideas. The Court
analogized the Wisconsin statute to federal and state antidiscrimination
laws such as Tide VII's prohibition of sexual harassment, which, it
explained, constituted "content-neutral regulation of conduct."
Intimidating Ms. Sierra with rape threats and sexually-demeaning
comments so that she shuts down her income-generating blog is
equally offensive, and equally proscribed, no matter the anonymous
perpetrators' specific views. When law punishes online attackers due to
the special severity of the social harm produced by targeting individuals
because of their gender or race, and not due to the particular opinions
that the attackers or victims express, no First Amendment values
are implicated.
Not only does a cyber civil rights agenda comport with First Amend-
ment doctrine, it is consistent with prominent free speech theories that
emphasize the importance of autonomy, cultural innovation, and the
promotion of truth. Restraining cyber gender harassment is essential to
defending the expressive autonomy of its victims. Although harassers
express themselves through their assaults, their actions direcdy implicate
their targets' self-determination and ability to participate in political and
social discourse. Self-expression should receive little protection if its
sole purpose is to extinguish the self-expression of another.
In short, cyber mobs inflict serious injuries that law must address.
Combating their cyber assaults requires a comprehensive approach,
one that includes traditional criminal prosecutions, tort remedies, and
civil rights actions. Together, traditional remedies and antidiscrimination
laws have great potential to deter, punish, and remedy the abuse of
online mobs. We can harness law's coercive power to reverse the back-
ward-looking trend without sacrificing our commitment to free speech.
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